By Greg Ip
For most countries, the economic slowdown in China and the
accompanying slump in commodity prices represent something between
nuisance and pothole. For Russia, they are a catastrophe.
Russia's currency and economy, already squeezed by Western
sanctions, have been sent into virtual free fall by slumping oil
prices. The International Monetary Fund predicted in July that
Russia's economy would shrink 3.4% this year, the most of any major
emerging market.
That now looks optimistic. Anders Aslund, a Russia expert at the
Atlantic Council in Washington, thinks 6% is more likely.
Coincidentally, that's close to what the Russian central bank
predicted would happen if oil fell to $40 a barrel, roughly its
current level.
Russian growth had averaged 7% from 1999 to 2008, due in great
part to high oil and natural-gas prices. The oil collapse has
exposed deep cracks in Russia's economic foundations: falling
productivity, a shrinking labor force, uncompetitive industries,
and private enterprise hemmed in by a kleptocratic state and crony
capitalism.
The IMF now puts Russia's long-term potential growth at 1.5%.
Mr. Aslund thinks it's just 1%, astonishing for a country whose
standard of living is barely 40% that of the U.S.
This matters almost as much for the world as it does for Russia.
Oil and gas wealth enabled Russian President Vladimir Putin to
cement his hold on power domestically and flex Russia's muscles
internationally. The loss of that wealth threatens to scramble the
world's geopolitical order, though there are no signs of that
yet.
There are parallels to the events that toppled the Soviet Union.
Until the 1970s, oil and gas didn't dominate the Soviet economy. It
was "an advanced (if inefficient) industrial and technological
power," writes Thane Gustafson in his 2012 book, "Wheel of Fortune:
the Battle for Oil and Power in Russia."
But its days were numbered. Socialist industrialization,
stagnant agriculture unable to feed a growing urban population, a
parasitic defense complex and uncompetitive manufacturing "made the
fall of the regime inevitable," Yegor Gaidar, an architect of
Russia's transition to a market economy under Boris Yeltsin, wrote
in his 2006 analysis, "Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern
Russia."
The oil-price spikes of the 1970s staved off collapse while
turning the Soviet Union into a petrostate. Oil and gas exports
enabled Russia to pay for grain imports from the West, prop up its
Eastern European satellites, and invade Afghanistan.
Mr. Gaidar, who died in 2009, traced the beginning of the end of
the Soviet Union to Saudi Arabia's decision in 1985 to cease
supporting the price of oil and ramp up production. The ensuing
price collapse eviscerated Soviet export revenues. Forced to borrow
from the West to pay for grain imports, Russia largely lost its
strategic leverage, first over Eastern Europe and then over its
Soviet republics. With hyperinflation and famine looming in 1991,
the Soviet Union broke up.
The parallels shouldn't be overdrawn. Unlike the Soviet Union
then, Russia today is a market economy, albeit one with a large
state presence. Macroeconomic policy is relatively responsible.
Last year the central bank abandoned the ruble's peg. The resulting
drop has sent up inflation and squeezed living standards, but also
cut imports.
Western sanctions over Russia's annexation of Crimea and support
for separatists in eastern Ukraine have curtailed new foreign
borrowing. This has preserved the surplus on Russia's current
account--the balance on all trade and investment income--and its
foreign currency reserves, preventing the sort of crisis that hit
the Soviet Union in 1991 and Russia in 1998.
The more important parallel is the damaging legacy of oil and
gas wealth. Russia has suffered a classic case of the "natural
resource curse," the tendency of easy resource wealth to prop up
inefficient industry, squeeze out manufacturing, and fuel
corruption. Natural resource rents--revenues from oil, gas, coal,
minerals and forest products minus their production
costs--represent 18% of Russia's GDP, the highest among major
emerging markets and far more than rich-country oil exporters like
Canada and Norway. Mr. Putin has used those rents to modernize the
military, expand the welfare state, and finance high-profile
projects such as the Sochi Olympics.
Meanwhile, an expanding state-owned sector has undermined what
private enterprise Russia had. Mr. Aslund cites the purchase by
state-controlled oil company Rosneft of the well-managed, private
competitor TNK-BP for $55 billion in 2013. Today,
"value-destroying" Rosneft is worth less than TNK-BP was then.
Western sanctions will further undermine productivity by depriving
Russian industry, including oil and gas, of essential know how. As
Western Europe seeks more stable sources of natural gas, Russian
exports will be further squeezed.
Former president and current Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had
sought to spur innovation to diversify away from oil and gas. But
as Russia experts Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes write in a
forthcoming book, even those diversification efforts depend on
subsidies generated by oil and gas.
Many of Russia's top officials are well aware of its challenges.
Central bank governor Elvira Nabiullina has called the current
economic slump "structural," blaming "unfavorable demographic
trends" and the "investment climate."
It isn't obvious, though, that Mr. Putin and his inner circle
are listening. After all, economic hardship has yet to undermine
his popularity at home or his ambitions abroad. History suggests
that shouldn't be taken for granted.
Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
September 02, 2015 14:01 ET (18:01 GMT)
Copyright (c) 2015 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.